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Background
The advanced encryption standard (AES) (Daemen and Rijmen 2002) is based on the 
substitution permutation network (SPN) which applies several layers of substitution 
and permutation. In any SPN, substitution followed by permutation is performed cer-
tain number of times to encrypt the plaintext into ciphertext in order to assure secure 
communication (Daemen and Rijmen 2002). The choice of a substitution box (S-box) 
(Shannon 1949) is the most sensitive step in determining the strength of a cryptosys-
tem against several attacks. It is therefore essential to understand the design and proper-
ties of an S-box for encryption applications (Detombe and Tavares 1992). The improved 
quality of the S-Box to enhance the confusion creating capability in certain SPN has 
been a challenge for researchers.
In literature many algorithms for algebraically complex and cryptographically strong 
S-boxes, such as AES, APA, Gray, Skipjack, Xyi and Residue Prime (RP) S-boxes, are 
available. For the interest of readers we give a brief description of these structures. The 
AES S-box is based on the composition of inversion map and the affine transformation. It 
is a non-Feistel cipher. The algebraic expression of AES S-box is simple and involves only 
nine items (Daemen and Rijmen 2002). The structure of APA S-box uses composition of 
affine surjection, power function and again affine surjection. This design improves the 
algebraic complexity from 9 to 253 as compared to the AES S-box (Cui and Cao 2007). 
The Gray S-box is obtained from the AES S-box with an additional transform based on 
binary Gray codes. It inherits all the important cryptographic properties of AES S-box 
with an increased security against attacks (Tran et al. 2008). Skipjack is a Feistel network 
based on 32 rounds. This algorithm uses an 80-bit key to encrypt or decrypt 64-bit data 
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blocks. The S-box based on Skipjack algorithm is also known as Skipjack F-table (Kim 
and Phan 2009). The XYi S-box is a mini version of a block cipher with block size of 8 
bits. It has increased efficiency in computer applications (Shi et al. 2002). The Residue 
Prime S-box uses the field of residues of a prime number as an alternative to the Galois 
field based S-boxes (Abuelyman and Alsehibani 2008). These widely used S-boxes play 
the role of benchmarks in the field of cryptography. Among these, AES, APA and Gray 
S-boxes attain the highest nonlinearity measure 112. The S-box algorithm proposed in 
this framework produces high nonlinearity effect as achieved by the top S-boxes AES, 
APA and Gray, however, unlike these S-boxes, our S-box is structured by employing a 
single direct map rather the composition of two or more maps which makes this algo-
rithm more efficient and economic in both software and hardware applications.
It is highly desired property for a cryptographically strong S-box to show good 
resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis (Biham and Shamir 1991; Mat-
sui 1998). For a Boolean function f, the linear cryptanalysis is based on finding affine 
approximation to the action of a cipher (Nyberg 1993). Recently some efficient models 
are studied for S-boxes based on fractional linear transformations (Hussain et al. 2011, 
2013a, b). S-box being the only nonlinear component in block cipher always requires 
high nonlinearity effect (Carlet and Ding 2004, 2007; Nyberg 1992, 1993). Motivated 
by some recently presented designs, we in this paper propose an algorithm to structure 
an 8× 8 S-box using fractional linear transformation applied on the Galois field GF(28) 
which produces very high nonlinearity measure. We further analyse the properties of 
the new S-box by different commonly used tests such as nonlinearity, strict avalanche 
criterion (SAC), bit independent criterion (BIC), linear and differential approximation 
probability tests (LAPT, DAPT). We then compare the results with those for the famous 
S-boxes and observe that our new S-box, based on a simple and straightforward algo-
rithm, produces coherent results.
The material presented in this paper is organized as follows. In “Algorithm for S-box” 
section we explain in detail the construction and major properties of the underlying 
Galois field GF(28). We further discuss some interesting features of the fractional linear 
transformation and describe how this transformation is applied on the Galois field to 
structure the new S-box. “Analyses of S-box” section deals with the analysis of S-box 
against several common attacks and compares the cryptographic potential of our pro-
posed S-box with other S-boxes such as AES, APA, Gray, Skipjack, Xyi and Residue 
Prime. In “Statistical analyses of S-box” section  we perform some statistical analysis 
based on the image encryption application of the S-box and in “Conclusion” section we 
present conclusion regarding the significance of the new S-box when critically observed 
in comparison with the previously known models.
Algorithm for S‑box
This section mainly deals with the structure of our S-box. Before we discuss the con-
stituent algorithm, we need to go through some fundamental facts.
A function f : Fn
2
→ F2 is called a Boolean function. We define a vectorial Boolean 





F(x) = (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)),
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where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 and each of fi’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ m is a Boolean function 
referred to as coordinate Boolean function. An n× n S-box is precisely defined as a vec-





At this stage, it seems quite practical to understand the structural properties of the 
Galois field used to construct an S-box. Generally for any prime p, Galois field GF(pn) 
is given by the factor ring Fp[X]/ < η(x) > where η(x) ∈ Fp[X] is an irreducible polyno-
mial of degree n.
For an 8× 8 S-box, we use GF(28). In advanced encryption standards (AES), 
the construction of GF(28) is based on the degree 8 irreducible polynomial 
η(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. In Hussain et al. (2013b), η(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1 
is used as the generating polynomial. Here we choose η(x) = x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1 as 
the irreducible polynomial that generates the maximal ideal < η(x) > of the principal 
ideal domain F2[X]. It is important to note that we may choose any degree 8 irreducible 
polynomial for constructing GF(28) however the choice of generating polynomial may 
affect our calculations as the binary operations are carried modulo the used polynomial 
(see Benvenuto 2012 for details).
Generally the construction of an S-box requires a nonlinear bijective map. In literature 
many algorithms based on such maps or their compositions are presented to synthe-
size cryptographically strong S-boxes. We present the construction of S-box based on an 
invertible nonlinear map known as the fractional linear transformation. It is a function 
of the form az+bcz+d generally defined on the complex plain C such that a, b, c and d ∈ C sat-
isfy the non-degeneracy condition ad − bc �= 0. The set of these transformations forms 
a group under the composition. The identity element in this group is the identity map 
and the the inverse dz−b
−cz+a of 
az+b
cz+d is assured by the condition ad − bc �= 0. One can eas-
ily observe that the algebraic expression of this map has a combined effect of inversion, 
dilation, rotation and translation. The nonlinearity and algebraic complexity of the frac-
tional linear transformation motivates the idea to employ this map for byte substitution.
For the proposed S-box we apply fractional linear transformation g on the Galois 
field discussed above, i.e. g : GF(28) → GF(28) given by g(t) = at+bct+d, where a, b, c and 
d ∈ GF(28) such that ad − bc �= 0 and t varies from 0 to 255 ∈ GF(28). We may choose 
any values for parameters a, b, c and d that satisfy the condition ad − bc �= 0. Here, for 
calculations, we take a = 29 = 00011101, b = 15 = 00001111, c = 8 = 00001000 and 
d = 9 = 00001001. One may observe that as we are working on a finite field, g(t) needs 
to be explicitly defined at t = 47 (at which denominator vanishes), so in order to keep g 
bijective we may define the transformation as given below;
Following the binary operations defined on the Galois field (Benvenuto 2012), we calcu-
late the images of g as shown in Table 1. Thus the images of the above defined transfor-
mation yield the elements of the proposed S-box (see Table 2).
It is important to mention that an 8× 8 S-box has 8 constituent Boolean functions. 
A Boolean function f is balanced if {x|f (x) = 0} and {x|f (x) = 1} have same cardinal-
ity or the Hamming weight HW(f ) = 2n−1. The significance of the balance property is 




8t+9 ; t �= 47
149; t = 47
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probability linear approximation being obtained. Thus, the imbalance makes a Boolean 
function weak in terms of linear cryptanalysis. Furthermore, a function with a large 
imbalance can easily be approximated by a constant function. All the Boolean func-
tions fi, i ≤ i ≤ 8, involved in the S-box as shown in Table 2 satisfy the balance property. 
Hence, the proposed S-box is balanced. It might be of interest that in order to choose 
feasible parameters leading to balanced S-boxes satisfying all other desirable properties 
(as discussed in the next section), one can use constraint programming, a problem solv-
ing strategy which characterises the problem as a set of constraints over a set of variables 
(Kellen 2014; Ramamoorthy et al. 2011).
An S-box is used to convert the plain data into the encrypted data, it is therefore 
essential to investigate the comparative performance of the S-box. We, in the next sec-
tion, analyse the newly designed S-box through various indices to establish the forte of 
our proposed S-box.
Analyses of S‑box
For the assessment of the cryptographic strength of our S-box, in this section, we apply 
some widely used analysis techniques such as nonlinearity, bit independence, strict ava-
lanche, linear and differential approximation probabilities etc. In the following subsec-
tions we present all these performance indices one by one.
Table 1 Images of g









124 18 154 77 3 216 99 81 117 91 112 125 88 32 10 96
227 253 141 194 235 5 111 9 122 37 206 233 156 72 53 51
184 7 20 239 102 22 166 210 192 97 226 27 12 248 79 149
69 59 196 220 132 109 94 168 234 84 15 108 120 52 142 14
25 90 151 205 93 0 26 171 217 41 1 67 224 197 21 198
130 174 231 161 199 153 76 6 144 170 246 221 43 232 29 219
61 229 191 242 195 95 137 225 157 75 39 119 44 98 104 87
115 89 56 110 160 42 31 249 169 222 146 11 245 238 136 247
54 139 200 8 36 46 126 218 121 165 105 16 58 35 135 164
207 230 2 243 63 123 214 80 68 55 183 114 107 208 62 163
252 145 116 250 13 204 127 228 187 113 49 86 159 83 152 244
180 193 57 173 133 128 150 30 40 190 255 240 237 155 85 175
162 47 134 50 60 28 186 177 33 202 176 19 70 209 24 178
71 38 212 48 201 172 129 143 215 188 181 147 158 65 101 100
251 179 182 203 140 223 66 254 64 23 45 189 17 213 131 4
73 211 167 74 78 148 236 185 92 241 82 103 118 106 34 138
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Nonlinearity
The nonlinearity indicator counts the number of bits which must be altered in the truth 
table of a Boolean function to approach the nearest affine function.
 Table  3 shows that for the newly designed S-box, the average nonlinearity meas-
ure is 112. Figure 1 shows that when we compare this with different famous S-boxes, 
the nonlinearity of the proposed S-box is similar to that of the top S-boxes such as 
AES, APA and Gray and much higher then that of the Skipjack, Xyi and Residue Prime 
S-boxes.  
Linear approximation probability
The linear approximation probability determines the maximum value of imbalance in 
the event. Let Ŵx and Ŵy be the input and output masks respectively and X consists of 
all possible inputs with cardinality 2n, the linear approximation probability for a given 
S-box is defined as;
Table 4 and Fig. 2 show that the linear approximation probability of the newly structured 
S-box is much better than those for Skipjack, Xyi and Residue prime S-boxes.
Differential approximation probability
The differential approximation probability is defined as;
LP = max
Ŵx ,Ŵy �=0





























Fig. 1 Nonlinearity of different S-boxes
Table 3 Performance Indices for new S‑box
Italic values are used for comparison purposes






Nonlinearity 112 112 112
SAC 0.5625 0.453125 0.510254 0.0165278
BIC 112 112 0
DP 0.015625
LP 144 0.0625
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where x and y are input and output differentials respectively. In ideal conditions, the 
S-box shows differential uniformity (Biham and Shamir 1991). The smaller the differen-
tial uniformity, the stronger is the S-box. It is evident from the Table 4 and Fig. 3 that the 
differential approximation probability of the proposed S-box is similar to those of the 
AES, APA and Gray S-boxes and much better than the Skipjack, Xyi and Residue Prime 
S-boxes.
Strict avalanche criterion
For any cryptographic design, when we change the input bits, the performance of the 
output bits is examined by this criterion. It is desired that a change in a single input bit 





is said to satisfy SAC if for a change in an input bit i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the probability of 
change in the output bit j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is 1/2. It is clear from the results shown in 
Table 4 and Fig. 4 that our S-box satisfies the requirements of this criterion.
Table 4 Comparison of performance indices for different S‑boxes
Italic values are used for comparison purposes
S-box Nonlinearity SAC BIC DP LP
AES 112 0.5058 112.0 0.0156 0.062
APA 112 0.4987 112.0 0.0156 0.062
Gray 112 0.5058 112.0 0.0156 0.062
Skipjack 105.7 0.4980 104.1 0.0468 0.109
Xyi 105 0.5048 103.7 0.0468 0.156
RP 99.5 0.5012 101.7 0.2810 0.132
New 112 0.510254 112 0.015625 0.0625















Fig. 2 LP of different S-boxes















Fig. 3 DP of different S-boxes
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Bit independence criterion
The criterion of bit independence, introduced by Webster and Tavares (1986), is used 
to analyse the behaviour of bit patterns at the output and the effects of these changes in 





, ∀ i, j and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with j �= k, inverting input bit i causes output 
bits j and k to change independently. In cryptographic systems it is highly desired to 
increase independence between bits as it makes harder to understand and forecast the 
design of the system.
The numerical results of BIC are given in Table 4 and are compared in Fig. 5. It can be 
observed that according to these results our S-box is quite similar to the AES, APA and 
Gray S-boxes.
Statistical analyses of S‑box
In this section we present some useful statistical analysis of the new and some famous 
S-boxes. We apply the majority logic criterion (Hussain et al. 2012) in order to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the proposed S-box in image encryption applications.
Due to the expeditious developments in the area of digital image processing, it is quite 
challenging to protect the digital information against different attacks. In the last few 
years many efficient algorithm have been presented by the researchers regarding secure 
image encryption schemes (Bao and Zhou 2015; Gao and Chen 2008; Murguia et al. 2012; 
Ramirez-Torres et al. 2014; Vargas-Olmos et al. 2015, 2016). During the image encryption 
process distortions occur and the strength of the encryption algorithm used is character-
ized by the type of these distortions. We examine this by using various parameters gener-
ated by different statistical analysis regarding entropy, contrast, correlation, energy and 


















Fig. 4 SAC of different S-boxes















Fig. 5 BIC of different S-boxes
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homogeneity respectively. We begin with the entropy analysis which is used to measure 
the randomness in a system. This characterizes the texture of image. Some other analyses 
(as named above) are also applied in combination with the entropy analysis to enhance 
the authenticity of the results regarding the performance of an S-box. Contrast analysis 
measures the ability to identify objects in an image. To ensure strong encryption an ele-
vated level of contrast is required. Correlation analysis is used to analyze the statistical 
properties of an S-box. By this analysis we determine the similarity between the pixels 
patterns of the plain and the encrypted images. Energy analysis determines the measure 
of the energy of an encrypted image when processed by various S-boxes. This measure 
gives the sum of squared elements in GLCM. The homogeneity analysis is used to deter-
mine the closeness of the elements distribution in the grey level co-occurrence matrix 
(GLCM) to GLCM diagonal. It is worth mentioning that a strong encryption algorithm 
requires a small measure of correlation, energy and homogeneity however high value of 
entropy and contrast.
Figure 6 shows the plain image of Lena and its encryption using the new S-box. It is 
quite obvious from the visual results that our method of encryption creates acceptable 
level of confusion.
For an image, its histogram graphically represents image-pixels distribution by plot-
ting the number of pixels at each intensity level (Ramirez-Torres et al. 2014). It has been 
established that the histogram of the original and the encrypted image should be signifi-
cantly different so that attackers could not extract the original image from the encrypted 
one. Figure 7 shows the respective histograms of Lena’s plain image and its encrypted 
a b 
Fig. 6 Lena’s plain image and its encryption using New S-box. a Plain image. b Encrypted Image
a b
Fig. 7 Histogram of the images in Fig. 6. a Plain image. b Encrypted Image
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version. The histogram analysis evidently proves the stability of our proposed method 
against any histogram based attacks.
In order to determine the quantitative measure of the efficiency of the proposed 
method in image encryption, MLC is applied on a typical 512× 512 image of Lena for 
the new S-box and results are compared with the other famous S-boxes. The numeri-
cal results for correlation, entropy, contrast, homogeneity and energy are arranged in 
Table 5. It is observed that the proposed S-box satisfies all the criteria to be used for the 
safe communication.  
We may further test the performance of the proposed method in noisy environ-
ments. For this purpose, we consider  ⊂ Z2 as a bounded rectangular grid. Let 
U = {u(i) | i ∈ �} and V = {v(i) | i ∈ �} be the true and noisy images, respectively, such 
that
where u(i) and v(i) ∈ R+ are the intensities of gray level and n(i) is an independent and 
identically different Gaussian random noise with zero mean and variance σ 2 at pixel 
i ∈ . The continuous image is interpreted as the Shannon interpolation of the discrete 
grid of samples v(i) over . The goal here is to test the performance of method on noisy 
image V in order to analyse the behaviour of proposed method in comparison with 
its test on the true image U. For this purpose three different noise levels with σ = 25, 
50 and 75 are considered in Fig.  8  to test the significant application of the proposed 
v(i) = u(i)+ n(i), i = (i1, i2) ∈ �,
Table 5 Comparison of MLC for new S‑box and different S‑boxes
Italic values are used for comparison purposes
Images Entropy Contrast Correlation Energy Homog.
Plain image 7.4451 0.2100 0.9444 0.1455 0.9084
AES 7.2531 7.5509 0.0554 0.0202 0.4662
APA 7.2264 8.1195 0.1473 0.0183 0.4676
Gray 7.2301 7.5283 0.0586 0.0203 0.4623
Skipjack 7.2214 7.7058 0.1025 0.0193 0.4689
Xyi 7.2207 8.3108 0.0417 0.0196 0.4533
RP 7.2035 7.6236 0.0855 0.0202 0.4640
New 7.2415 7.4568 0.0785 0.0223 0.4731
a b c
Fig. 8 Noise-effected images. a σ = 25, b σ = 50, c σ = 75
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algorithm. It can be observed that in case of noisy environment slight variations occur 
in visual quality and quantitative results as shown in Fig. 9 and Table 6. One can see 
that the entropy level of noise corrupted pixels is decreasing with increase in the level 
of Gaussian random noise. It shows most of the pixels are adopting similar grey levels in 
random data instead of particular arrangement of pixels in the original image. The con-
trast level also decreases with increasing noise level. Similarly changes in other param-
eters can be observed. The comparative analysis performed by applying AES S-box at 
the same noise levels is also shown in Table 7 and Fig. 10. One can observe that, with 
the increase in noise, the visual and numerical results obtained by the newly designed 
S-box are better or at least pretty similar to the recent state-of-the-art AES S-box (Dae-
men and Rijmen 2002).
Based on the experimental results regarding the overall performance of our proposed 
algorithm, it is demonstrated that the newly synthesized S-box satisfies all the criteria of 
acceptability to be used for secure communication.
Table 6 Results for encryption using new S‑box in different noisy environments
Images Entropy Contrast Correlation Energy Homog.
Plain image 7.4451 0.2100 0.9444 0.1455 0.9084
Encryption at σ = 25 7.1936 7.3974 0.0068 0.0153 0.3934
Encryption at σ = 50 7.1545 7.2851 0.0043 0.0161 0.3992
Encryption at σ = 75 7.1269 6.5029 0.0015 0.0180 0.4133
Table 7 Results for encryption using AES S‑box in different noisy environments
Images Entropy Contrast Correlation Energy Homog.
Encryption at σ = 25 7.1438 7.4417 0.0047 0.0159 0.3921
Encryption at σ = 50 7.0705 7.3104 0.0033 0.0162 0.3933
Encryption at σ = 75 7.0475 7.124 0.0017 0.0178 0.4023
a b c
Fig. 9 Encryption with the proposed S-box in noisy environments. a Encryption of Fig. 8a. b Encryption of 
Fig. 8b. c Encryption of Fig. 8c
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Conclusion
In this work we propose an S-box structured by an extremely simple and direct algo-
rithm. Its strength is analyzed by several tests and it is self-evident that its confusion 
creating capability is quite high as compared to some other very famous S-boxes. The 
algebraic complexity based on the fractional linear transformation produces ideal results 
that make this S-box authentic and more reliable.
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